||[Sep. 19th, 2005|11:02 pm]
I have a few (large) questions. I figured I'd swallow my pride and see if anyone here is better read on these issues and has anything insightful to say about any of these questions. I apologize beforehand for any spelling or grammatical errors. |
As you'll see they mainly deal with issues of 'reason', 'subjectivity', 'intersubjectivity', 'ontology', 'dialectic' and 'political action' in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Gadamer, Taylor and Ricoeur.
1. It seems that recent continental philosophy has often wanted to overcome the subject-object distinction, some wanting to go as far as to eliminate the subject. "Intersubjectivity" seems to be a popular notion, and I was wanting that unpacked a little for me to properly understand this notion. Furthermore, I was wondering what the state of subjectivity/intersubjectivity in thinkers I am currently most interested in (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Gadamer, Taylor, Ricoeur). Gadamer seems minimize the role of subjective choice by saying "prejudices, more than personal judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being", but how does this mentality relate to these other thinkers? Taylor seems to me to take the same view. Mitscherling noted a distinct 'deterministic' viewpoint in Gadamer, which I haven't yet noticed, but I suppose minimizing the subject's role in choice could lead to something like that. Is one of the main reasons for overcoming 'subjectivisim' that in the hermeneutic circle one is unable to give priority to either structure (objectification?) or action (subjectivism?) as the entering point, and in this way hermeneutics is the only way to balance the priorities of subjectivism and the demands of the "death of subjectivity" camp (eg. Foucault). That is how it seems to sound in on Pg. 174 of Taylor's "Foucault on Freedom and Truth." But Habermas writes on pg. 341 of "A review of Gadamer's 'Truth and Method'" that "the unbroken intersubjectivity cancels out subjectivity." Does this mean that pure intersubjectivity cannot make room for the demands of the subjective? Furthermore, on a related point, In "Overcoming Epistemology" (pg. 16) Taylor accuse Derrida of talking about the "end of subjectivity" but offering it instead - how?
This leads to my second question
( and 11 other questionsCollapse )